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Ganging Up on Immigration Law: Asylum
Law and the Particular Social Group
Standard – Former Gang Members and
Their Need for Asylum Protections
Claudia B. Quintero
13 U. MASS. L. REV. 192
ABSTRACT
The Refugee Act of 1980 was a significant piece of legislation for the development
of asylum law, and the United States’ commitment to human rights and humanitarian
concern for the struggles of refugees worldwide. The Act recognized the urgent
needs of persons fleeing persecution in their homelands, asylees, and their need for
protection and resettlement. The protections afforded in the Act extended to asylum
seekers that were persecuted on the basis of (1) race, (2) religion, (3) nationality, (4)
membership in a particular social group, or (5) political opinion. However, Congress
did not define “membership in a particular social group” in the Refugee Act of 1980
or otherwise, and have left it to the Board of Immigration Appeals to interpret the
term “membership in particular social group.” As such, the Board of Immigration
Appeals has developed, through case law, an arbitrary and loose definition
for “membership in a particular social group.” With such arbitrariness, as discussed
in this Article, any group, including former gang members fleeing their country and
seeking asylum could make a cognizable claim that they are a “member of
a particular social group,” and therefore ought to be afforded protections under the
Refugee
Act
of
1980.
This Article examines the history of asylum law that developed after the passing of
the Refugee Act of 1980, specifically the “particular social group” standard as it was
developed through Board of Immigration Appeals decisions, and a brief history of
the development of the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs in the Northern Triangle of
Central America. Ultimately, this Article examines a circuit court split on whether
former gang members constitute a “particular social group.” This Article takes the
position that former gang members do constitute a “particular social group,” and thus
should be afforded asylum protections.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I

magine this: you are born in El Salvador, fatherless, and in extreme
poverty. You fall into a neighborhood gang, the Mara Salvatrucha
13,1 where gang leaders order you to extort your neighbors. You are
beaten when you resist and threatened with death when you try to quit
the gang. You no longer feel safe and flee to the United States seeking
protection.
A gang member renouncing his gang membership and fleeing to
the United States is essentially a death wish. Former gang members
who flee to the United States in search of asylum protection are fleeing
violent persecution from the gangs to which they used to be loyal. This
is the factual circumstance of five federal courts of appeals cases,
where repentant former gang members have fled to the United States
in search of asylum protections; three petitioners have been successful
in their argument that they are members of a “particular social group,”2
and two petitioners have not been successful.3
This Article will demonstrate that the United States Court of
Appeals for the First and Ninth Circuits, which ruled against the
asylum seekers, erred in their decisions when they ruled that former
gang members do not constitute a “particular social group.”4 Part II of
this Article will provide background on the gang culture that exists in
Central America. Part III of this Article will provide a brief overview
of asylum law, and the development of the “particular social group”
standard.5 Part IV will provide relevant case law and discuss the five
circuit court cases that have created the current circuit court split.6 Part
1

2

3

4
5

6

See Sonja Wolf, Mara Salvatrucha: The Most Dangerous Street Gang in the
Americas?, 54 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 65, 65 (2012).
See Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 905-06 (4th Cir. 2014); Urbina-Mejia v.
Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 2010); Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 431
(7th Cir. 2009).
See Garay Reyes v. Lynch 842 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2016); Cantarero v.
Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 85-87 (1st Cir. 2013).
Garay Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1129; Cantarero, 734 F.3d at 85-87.
Hereinafter the terms “member of a particular social group” and “particular
social group” are meant as terms of art and will be referenced without quotation
marks. The term is an element of the asylum standard carved out through case
law by the Board of Immigration Appeals.
See generally Garay Reyes, 842 F.3d 1125; Cantarero, 734 F.3d 82; Martinez,
740 F.3d 902; Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d 360; Ramos, 589 F.3d 426.
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V of this Article will discuss the procedural aspect of the Board of
Immigration Appeals decisions.7 Part VI will offer an analysis of how
the inconsistency of the Board of Immigration Appeals, in its
application of the particular social group standard, has set the stage for
the current circuit split.8 The best resolution to this split is by having
circuit courts consider former gang members as a particular social
group because they meet the requirements of the standard.9
II. BACKGROUND
A. Northern Triangle: The Culture and Origins of the MS-13
and Mara 18
Gangs have terrorized Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador (“the
Northern Triangle”)10 since the 1990s.11 The Northern Triangle is now
home to two of the largest and most violent gangs, the Barrios 18 (“M18” or “18th Street”) and the Mara Salvatrucha (“MS-13”).12 Both
gangs began in the inner-city of Los Angeles, California in response to
exclusion from already existing gangs comprised of other ethnicities.13
7

8

9
10

11

12

13

See Kathleen Kersh, An Insurmountable Obstacle: Denying Deference to the
BIA’s Social Visibility Requirement 19 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 153, 166 (2013).
Christopher J. Preston, Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Particular and
Socially Visible Masses: The Eighth Circuit’s New Standard Governing
Particular Social Group Asylum Applications After Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d
678 (8th Cir. 2012), 92 NEB. L. REV. 431, 443 (2013).
See, e.g., Martinez, 740 F.3d 902.
Cynthia J. Arnson & Eric L. Olson, Introduction, in ORGANIZED CRIME IN
CENTRAL AMERICA: THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE, 1, 1 (Cynthia J. Arnson & Eric
L. Olson ed., 2011) (El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are part of the
Northern Triangle area of Central America, also known as just “the Northern
Triangle.”).
See Steven S. Dudley, Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America:
Transportistas, Mexican Cartels, and Maras, in ORGANIZED CRIME IN CENTRAL
AMERICA: THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE 18, 41 (Cynthia J. Arnson & Eric L. Olson
ed., 2011); Jillian N. Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence: A Reason to Grant
Political Asylum from Mexico and Central America, 38 YALE J. OF INT’L L.
ONLINE 31, 32-34 (2012) [hereinafter Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence]; Juan J.
Fogelbach, Gangs, Violence, and Victims in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 417, 418 (2011).
Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence, supra note 11, at 32; Dudley, supra note 11,
at 41; Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 420.
Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence, supra note 11, at 32; Fogelbach, supra note
11, at 420-21.
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The 18th Street gang was created in the 1960s by Mexican-American
youth in the Rampart neighborhood of Los Angeles; the gang grew to
incorporate members of various ethnicities, including “Central
Americans as they arrived in large numbers in the 1980s.”14 Many Los
Angeles based MS-13 and M-18 gang members were refugees who
fled civil war violence in El Salvador and Guatemala during the 1980s,
and were living illegally in the United States.15 Some Central
American refugees joined the already established gangs; however,
most Salvadoran youth complained of being victimized by the
established gangs and formed their own gang, MS-13, exclusively for
Salvadoran youth.16
In the late 1990s, many Central American refugees, especially
those that were involved in gangs, were deported back to their
countries of origin after the implementation of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.17 The United
States facilitated the removal of young men, who had entered the
United States illegally, and were involved in criminal and gang-related
activity.18 Most of the deportees were young men who had joined
gangs, and served time in U.S. prisons.19 Ultimately, many of these
young men were deported back to their country of origin, “despite
often having no family there, and having limited or non-existent
14
15

16
17

18

19

Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 420.
Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence, supra note 11, at 32; Fogelbach, supra note
11, at 420-21.
Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 420-21.
Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 421; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, tit. 3 §§ 303-05, 110 Stat.
3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1996)); see
generally Dara Lind, The Disastrous, Forgotten 1996 Law That Created
Today’s Immigration Problem, VOX (Apr. 28, 2016, 8:40 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2016/4/28/11515132/iirira-clinton-immigration
[https://perma.cc/8CKL-YMNR].
Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence, supra note 11, at 32; Fogelbach, supra
note11, at 421.
See Joshua Keating, The Unintended Consequences of Deporting Criminals,
SLATE
(Feb.
23,
2017,
12:41
PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2017/02/23/deporting_criminals_to_cent
ral_america_helped_cause_the_same_violence_that.html
[https://perma.cc/RMU2-MNAD]; see also Clare Ribando Seelke, Gangs in
Central America, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 3 (Aug. 29, 2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf [https://perma.cc/B43K-MF4A].
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Spanish language skills.”20 The newly deported gang members
depended on each other and replicated the gang culture they had
learned in the United States.21 “Gang cliques”22 were established in
Central America and have since grown to a total of approximately
“36,000 [gang members] in Honduras, 10,500 in El Salvador, and
14,000 in Guatemala.”23
There are approximately nine hundred gang cliques currently
operating within the Northern Triangle.24 Operationally, the cliques
have a sophisticated power structure, but do not have a centralized
leader making the decisions.25 Instead, the gangs are “composed of
numerous vertically-organized, cooperative cliques” with local bosses
and leaders at a municipal level.26 Leadership within the gang usually
begins with a neighborhood clique leader, followed by “municipal
leaders, department leaders, leaders for gang members outside of
prison, prison gang leaders, country leaders, and ultimately
international leaders.”27 Most gang recruits are associated with certain
risk factors that make them vulnerable to gangs.28 These factors
include: “conditions of poverty, family disintegration or separation,
neglect, violent domestic environments, unemployment, scarcity of
educational and developmental opportunities, and family membership
in gangs.”29 The gangs in the Northern Triangle offer social
20

21
22

23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Douglas Farah, Organized Crime in El Salvador: Its Homegrown and
Transnational Dimensions, in ORGANIZED CRIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA: THE
NORTHERN TRIANGLE 104, 112 (Cynthia J. Arnson & Eric L. Olson ed., 2011).
Id.
Jennifer J. Adams & Jesenia M. Pizarro, MS-13: A Gang Profile, 16 J. GANG
RES. 1, 4 (2009) (“The MS-13 [and 18th Street gang are] divided into subgroups
called cliques; each clique has its own name and is in charge of defending a
certain amount of territory. For example, in Los Angeles, a clique of sixty-five
members was in charge of patrolling thirty-three street blocks. Each clique is
independent of one another, but they will band together in response to a
perceived threat. Cliques may also work together in some criminal activities,
such as dealing drugs and selling weapons.”).
Dudley, supra note 11, at 42; Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 420.
Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 422.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 424.
Id.
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acceptance and an alternative way to acquire certain goods to which
individuals might not otherwise have access.30 Due to the risk factors
many youth face, they turn to gangs in search of “protection, a social
and substitute family network, and a source of livelihood.”31
Much of the ongoing social violence in the Northern Triangle is
attributable to gang-based criminal activity.32 Extremely high levels of
homicide have resulted from gang violence perpetuated against
citizens of the Northern Triangle.33 This area is the most violent region
in the world.34 In 2015, the Northern Triangle recorded over 17,422
homicides, an 11 percent increase over the previous year.35 Gang
culture in the Northern Triangle is so ingrained within the culture that
in El Salvador there is a saying: “if you’re not in a gang, then you’re
against gangs.”36 Recruitment for the gangs is focused on integrating
street children that are vulnerable to the gangs, taking them off the
streets and providing them with a better standard of living.37 In
addition to recruiting street children, gangs also recruit in and around
schools, going as far as demanding payment from schools and
harassing students.38 Most often, gangs “coerce, intimidate, or force
[vulnerable] children to deliver messages; stand as lookouts; and
30
31
32

33

34

35

36
37
38

Id.
Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 437; see also Michael Shifter, Countering Criminal Violence in Central
America, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: CENTER FOR PREVENTATIVE
ACTION
1,
7
(Apr.
2012),
https://cfrd8files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2012/03/Criminal_Violence_CSR64.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D89A-QXKQ].
Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 439-41; see Rocio Cara Labrador & Danielle
Renwick, Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL.
1,
4
(last
updated
Jan.
18,
2018),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle
[https://perma.cc/D2WW-ZNLX].
Arnson & Olson, supra note10, at 1-2, 28-30; Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 440;
see generally Labrador & Renwick, supra note 33.
AFP, El Salvador Becomes World’s Most Deadly Country Outside a War Zone,
TELEGRAPH
(Jan.
5,
2016,
11:15
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/els
alvador/12083903/El-Salvador-becomes-worlds-most-deadly-country-outside-awar-zone.html [perma.cc/7QL8-EJUV].
Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 429.
Id. at 432.
Id.
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distribute drugs, weapons, and liquor,” and sometimes even “rob or
kill.”39 Sometimes, gang members decide they do not want to be a part
of such violence and choose to disassociate themselves from the
gang.40 Members must seek permission to leave the gang, and those
that are not given permission or do not ask for permission are
“considered traitors, and according to gang norms, all cliques are
notified and have the ‘green light’ to kill them.”41 Fearing retaliation,
defecting gang members flee their countries, leaving everything
behind, including their families, in search of asylum protection in the
United States.42
III. THE BASICS OF ASYLUM LAW
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which was amended
by the Refugee Act of 1980 to include “explicit asylum provisions . . .
for the first time,” confers upon the Attorney General of the United
States the authority to grant asylum to any eligible refugee.43 The INA
defines a refugee as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such
person’s nationality . . . who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.44

39
40
41
42
43

44

Id.
Id. at 435-36.
Id. at 436.
See id. at 462.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2014) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. §1103 et seq.); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a)(1) (2009); see also Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15
INT’L MIGRATION REV., 141, 143 (1981); see also Ivan A. Tereschenko, The
Board of Immigration Appeals’ Continuous Search for the Definition of
“Membership in A Particular Social Group” in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter
of W-G-R-: In the Context of Youth Resistant to Gang Recruitment in Central
America, 30 CONN. J. INT’L L. 93, 99 (2014).
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 1101(a)(42).
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The INA’s definition of refugee is derived from the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol, two key international provisions governing the
protection of refugees.45 In 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed into
law the Refugee Act of 1980, which adopted the United Nations’ 1951
Refugee Convention (the “1951 Convention”), relating to the status of
refugees.46 This Act allows individuals fleeing from their home
countries to petition for asylum in the United States.47 The Act
requires individuals to demonstrate “a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”48 There is no statutory
definition for the particular social group categorization, nor does
legislative history provide an exact definition, this Article’s focus is to
further analyze and define the particular social group category.49
A. Development of the Particular Social Group Standard
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) defined particular social
group in the seminal case Matter of Acosta, as “persons of similar
background, habits, or social status.”50 The BIA applied the doctrine of
ejusdem generis to develop guidelines for construing the particular
social group standard.51 The Board held that each of the four
categories (race, religion, nationality and political opinion):
45

46

47

48
49
50

51

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, at art. 1 § 2, 19 U.S.T. 6225, 606
U.N.T.S 267 (Jan. 31, 1967); United Nations Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees, at art. 1, 2545 U.N.T.S 38 (July 28, 1951); see also Tereschenko,
supra note 43, at 99.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. § 1521 et seq. (1952)); see
generally Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981);
see also Kennedy, supra note 43, at 141.
See generally Kennedy, supra note 43, at 141; see also Anker & Posner, supra
note 46, at 9.
Refugee Act, § 201 (emphasis added).
Tereschenko, supra note 43, at 99.
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). Matter of Acosta was
overruled in part by Matter of Mogharrabi where the court held “that the ‘clear
probability’ standard and the ‘well-founded fear’ standard are not meaningfully
different and, in practical application, converge. That portion of [the decision] in
Matter of Acosta has therefore been effectively overruled.” Matter of
Mogharrabi 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441 (BIA 1987).
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. at 233 (explaining that the ejusdem generis doctrine
literally translates to “of the same kind” and “holds that general words used in
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describes persecution aimed at an immutable
characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the
power of an individual to change or is so fundamental
to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be
required to be changed . . . . [And the phrase]
“persecution on account of membership in a particular
social group” to mean persecution that is directed
toward an individual who is a member of a group of
persons all of whom share a common, immutable
characteristic.52
Following Matter of Acosta, the BIA applied the particular social
group test in two important cases that have helped shape asylum law,53
Matter of Toboso-Alfonso,54 and In re Fauziya Kasinga.55 Each case,

52
53

54

55

an enumeration with specific words should be construed in a manner consistent
with the specific words.”).
Id.
See Particular Social Group Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum After
Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. 1, 1
(2014),
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/PSG%2520Practice%2520A
dvisory%2520and%2520Appendices-Final-1.22.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SE965F2] [hereinafter Applying for Asylum]; see also Jillian Blake, Getting to
Group Under U.S. Asylum Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 167, 168
(2015) [hereinafter Blake, Getting to Group].
See generally Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1990)
(holding that homosexuals in Cuba were a particular social group for purposes
of asylum). The Cuban government persecuted applicant because of his sexual
orientation as a homosexual man. Id. at 820. Applicant testified that being
homosexual was a criminal offense in Cuba, and that the government had
allowed the Union of Community Youth to demonstrate against homosexuals at
his workplace. Id. at 821. Because of his homosexuality, applicant was forced to
work in a labor camp for 60 days. Id.
See In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (BIA 1996) (holding that
“young women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern
Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by
that tribe, and who opposed the practice,” were a protected particular social
group). Applicant was a 19-year-old female of Togo and a member of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe. Id. at 358. Custom among the tribe was for young
women, around the age of fifteen, to undergo female genital mutilation
(“FGM”). Id. Refugee had been spared FGM at the age of fifteen because she
was protected by her father, who was very influential within the tribe. Id. When
applicant’s father died her aunt forced her into a polygamous marriage, and
before she was to consummate her marriage she was required to undergo FGM.
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Matter of Toboso-Alfonso and In re Fauziya Kasinga, established that
particular social groups could be comprised of individuals of a
particular sexual orientation or a particular gender targeted for
mutilation, respectively.56
In Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, the Cuban government persecuted
applicant because of his sexual orientation as a homosexual man.57
The Cuban government gave applicant the choice to be jailed for four
years in a penitentiary or to leave Cuba for the United States.58
Applicant opted to leave Cuba during the Mariel boatlift of 1980.59
The court withheld deportation in Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, and the
applicant was recognized as a member of a particular social group.60
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed, arguing
that homosexuals were not a particular social group.61 The BIA
rejected INS’ argument stating that “among other showings
[applicants] must establish facts demonstrating that members of the
group are persecuted, have a well-founded fear of persecution, or that
their life or freedom would be threatened because of that status.”62
Applicant, here, established these criteria.
In In re Fauziya Kasinga, applicant was a 19-year-old female
citizen of Togo and a member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe located
in northern Togo.63 Custom among the tribe was for young women,
around the age of fifteen, to undergo female genital mutilation

56

57
58
59

60
61
62
63

Id. Fearing that she would be mutilated, she fled Togo for Ghana and Germany
by airplane, eventually ending up in the United States. Id. at 358-59.
See Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. at 822; see also In re Fauziya
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. at 357.
Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. at 820.
Id. at 821.
Id. at 821; see also Susana Peña, “Obvious Gays” and the State Gaze: Cuban
Gay Visibility and U.S. Immigration Policy During the 1980 Mariel Boatlift, 16
J. OF THE HIST. OF SEXUALITY 482, 484 (2007). (“[T]he Mariel boatlift began on
28 March 1980 when a Cuban bus driver took a busload of passengers into the
Peruvian embassy in Havana to seek asylum. A week later, as tensions
escalated, [Fidel] Castro announced that anyone seeking asylum would be
allowed to leave Cuba and pulled back the troops guarding the embassy.”).
Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. at 819, 822.
Id. at 822.
Id.
In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (BIA 1996).
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(FGM).64 Fearing that she would be mutilated, applicant fled Togo for
Ghana and then Germany by airplane, eventually ending up in the
United States.65 In re Fauziya Kasinga established that “the particular
social group is defined by common characteristics that members of the
group either cannot change, or should not be required to change
because such characteristics are fundamental to their individual
identities.”66
The particular social group standard was further developed and
clarified by the BIA in In re C-A- and Matter of S-E-G-.67 These cases
provide that, in addition to the immutable characteristic requirement,
particular social groups had to “be socially visible, and particularly
defined.”68 In re C-A- expanded the particular social group category by
stating that the “social visibility” of members in a claimed group is an
important element for identifying the existence of a particular social
group for asylum purposes.69 Most recently, two cases, Matter of M-EV-G- and Matter of W-G-R-,70 have clarified the “social visibility”
64
65
66
67

68
69
70

Id.
Id. at 358-59.
Id. at 366.
See generally In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006). Colombian applicant
befriended a member of the Cali drug cartel and became an informant to the
General Counsel of the city, who prosecuted the drug cartels. Id. at 951.
Applicant argued he was persecuted because of his relationship to both
individuals. Id. at 953. The court incorporated immutability of past experience
and social visibility into their determination of whether applicant was part of a
particular social group. Id. at 958-61. The court found applicant did not
demonstrate that he was persecuted based on his membership in a particular
social group. Id. at 961. See also Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582-86
(BIA 2008) (establishing the “particularly” element for the particular social
group standard). Respondents were youth in El Salvador who were persecuted
by the gangs and harassed for refusing to join the gang. Id. at 579-80.
Applying for Asylum, supra note 53, at 2.
In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. at 959-61.
See generally Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014).
Respondent was persecuted by “members of the Mara Salvatrucha gang [who]
beat him, kidnaped [sic] and assaulted him and his family while they were
traveling in Guatemala, and threatened to kill him if he did not join the gang.”
Id. at 228.; see also Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 215-18 (BIA 2014).
Respondent, who was a former member of the 18th Street gang, claimed he was
a member of a particular social group after “members of his former gang
confronted him after he left the gang, and he was shot in the leg during one of
two attacks he suffered. He fled to the United States after he was targeted for
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element of the particular social group test, which was criticized by
courts for being confusing and too literal.71 These cases broadened the
meaning of “social visibility,” and clarified that the meaning was not
“literal or ‘ocular’ visibility,” but instead was meant to “emphasize
‘perception’ and ‘recognition.’”72 In both Matter of M-E-V-G- and
Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA stated, “we now rename the ‘social
visibility’ requirement as ‘social distinction.’”73 The BIA further
clarified that “to be socially distinct, a group need not be seen by
society; it must instead be perceived as a group by society.”74
Asylum seekers often select “membership in a particular social
group” as the basis for their asylum application.75 Each case that the
BIA takes on for review regarding the particular social group standard
and a claim for a new particular social group adds on to the already
complex field of asylum law.76 For an individual to satisfy the
particular social group standard, an applicant must show: (1) he or she
is a member of a group; (2) the constituent members of the group share
immutable characteristics, and the group is both; (3) socially distinct;
and (4) particularly defined.77

71

72

73
74

75
76

77

retribution for leaving the gang.” Id. at 209. In both cases the Board clarified
that the “social visibility” element of a particular social group does not mean
“literal or ocular visibility” and renamed the element as “social distinction.” Id.
at 216; Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. at 236.
Linda Kelly, The New Particulars of Asylum’s “Particular Social Group,” 36
WHITTIER L. REV. 219, 224 (2015).
Id. The argument here is that the perception ought to be from the perspective of
the individual doing the persecuting and not just any random observer. Id.
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. at 236; Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. at 212.
Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. at 216. The court found that “it is critical that the
terms used to describe the group have commonly accepted definitions in the
society of which the group is a part.” Id. at 214.
Applying for Asylum, supra note 53, at l.
See generally Resources for Asylum Claims Based on Membership in a
Particular
Social
Group,
NAT’L
IMMIGRANT
JUST.
CTR.,
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/resources/resources-asylum-claims-basedmembership-particular-social-group
(last
visited
Apr.
16,
2018)
[https://perma.cc/CCN5-RGGX]; see also Reena Arya, BIA Requires Asylum
Seekers to Identify Particular Social Group, CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK
INC.,
https://cliniclegal.org/resources/bia-requires-asylum-seekers-identifyparticular-social-group (last visited May 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/SE2NBJEZ].
Applying for Asylum, supra note 53, at app. B at 9. Readers should take notice
that this Article only addresses the particular social group standard of the asylum
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IV. THE GANG’S ALL HERE: AN EXAMINATION OF CIRCUIT COURT
CASES
Five cases, factually similar, and posing the same argument, have
made their way to various circuit courts across the country.78 In three
of the cases, Martinez v. Holder, Urbina-Mejia v Holder, and Ramos v.
Holder, the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, respectively, held that,
for asylum purposes, former gang membership constituted
membership in a particular social group.79 By way of contrast in
Cantarero v. Holder, and Garay Reyes v. Lynch, the First and Ninth
Circuits, respectively, upheld the BIA’s decision to deny the
petitioner’s argument that former gang members constituted a
particular social group.80 In Cantarero v. Holder, and Garay Reyes v.
Lynch, the BIA ruled that former gang members were not a particular
social group, and thus not eligible for protection under the Refugee
Act.81 This circuit split is worthy of consideration, and warrants a
deeper look.
In 2009, the Seventh Circuit heard Ramos v. Holder and held that
former gang members constituted a particular social group because
they meet the “social visibility” factor of the standard; the court did
not consider the other prongs of the standard.82 Petitioner was born and

78

79

80
81
82

process. It is critical to note that asylum law is a vastly complex form of
immigration relief. The process for applying for asylum, which is not the topic
of this Article, is long and considers many aspects of an asylum seeker’s life.
Merely satisfying the elements of the particular social group standard does not
qualify an individual for asylum protections, it is but one aspect of many
requirements for asylum eligibility. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., BASIC
PROCEDURAL MANUAL FOR ASYLUM REPRESENTATION AFFIRMATIVELY AND IN
REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS
(Jan.
2017),
http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/contenttype/resource/documents/201701/NIJC%20Asylum%20Manual_01%202017_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3LVZ-44XK].
See Garay Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2016); Martinez v.
Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 905-06 (4th Cir. 2014); Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82,
83-84 (1st Cir. 2013); Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 362-63 (6th Cir.
2010); Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 428 (7th Cir. 2009).
See Martinez, 740 F.3d at 913; Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 367; Ramos, 589 F.3d
at 431.
See Cantarero, 734 F.3d at 86-87; see Garay Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1138.
See Cantarero, 734 F.3d at 87; Garay Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1132.
Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430-31.
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raised in El Salvador.83 At the age of fourteen he joined the Mara
Salvatrucha, and was a member for almost ten years.84 In 2003,
petitioner immigrated to the United States and reconnected with his
Christian values.85 He feared that if he returned to El Salvador he
would not be able to rejoin the gang without violating his “Christian
scruples and that the gang would kill him for his refusal to rejoin.”86
Petitioner also had MS-13 tattoos on his face and body, and the court
found that if he had them removed the gang would still recognize
him.87 The court ruled in the favor of petitioner, supporting its decision
by reasoning that petitioner met the social visibility element of the
particular social group standard.88 The court reasoned that “[i]f society
recognizes a set of people having certain common characteristics as a
group, this is an indication that being in the set might expose one to
special treatment, whether friendly or unfriendly.”89 In this case,
petitioner was a member of an easily identifiable “specific, wellrecognized, indeed notorious gang.”90
In 2010, following Ramos, the Sixth Circuit heard Urbina-Mejia v.
Holder.91 Urbina-Mejia was a citizen of Honduras who arrived in the
United States when he was seventeen years old.92 He had lived in
Memphis, Tennessee with his mother, and had no criminal record in
the United States.93 Urbina-Mejia fled his homeland to escape from
gang life.94 At the age of fourteen, he joined the 18th Street gang, and
remained a member for three years.95 Urbina-Mejia claimed he
received death threats if he did not do what he was told by upper-level
gang members.96 He recalled that other members of the gang taught
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. 428.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 430-31.
Id.
Id. at 431.
See generally Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 363.
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him how to use a nine-millimeter handgun, and that sometimes he
would use a baseball bat to intimidate, and at times harm victims.97
Urbina-Mejia testified, “he [had] never seriously injured any rival
gang member” and “he regretted his criminal activities but worried
that he would be killed if he did not participate.”98 In considering
Urbina-Mejia’s claim, the court reasoned that “being a former member
of a group ‘is an immutable characteristic and that mistreatment
because of such status could be found to be persecution on account
of . . . membership in a particular social group.’”99 Additionally, the
court noted that, similar to Martinez, “once one has left the gang, one
is forever a former member of that gang,” and as such could possibly
be “recognized by the 18th Street gang and the MS-13 gang as an exgang member if he returned to Honduras.”100 The court held that
Urbina-Mejia was a member of a particular social group.101
Martinez v. Holder, heard by the Fourth Circuit in 2014, involved a
Salvadoran refugee who was a former member of the MS-13 gang.102
Julio Martinez fled violence in his homeland at the age of twenty and
moved to Baltimore, Maryland with his family.103 Martinez’s
stepfather died when he was twelve years old, and like many young
kids, Martinez found solace and a family in MS-13.104 After joining
MS-13 in El Salvador, Martinez refused orders from the gang’s leaders
to commit crimes against his neighbors and left the gang.105 Gang
members who did not accept Martinez’s departure made multiple
attempts on his life.106 Martinez fled El Salvador and stayed with his
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

104
105
106

Id.
Id.
Id. at 366 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 367.
Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 905-06 (4th Cir. 2014).
Lauren Gold, Caught in the Crossfire, 2014 Art. 14 MD. CAREY L. MAG. 1, 1
(2014),
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1090&co
ntext=mcl [https://perma.cc/452J-VE44].
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Pamela Constable, Former Salvadoran Gang Member Says He’s
Living Right and Deserves U.S. Protection, WASH. POST (May 18, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/former-salvadoran-gang-member-sayshes-living-right-and-deserves-us-protection/2014/05/18/1aa2e7e6-dacd-11e3-
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sister in Maryland.107 In Martinez, the court concluded “that the BIA
erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of the phrase ‘particular
social group’ by holding that former gang membership is not an
immutable characteristic.”108
The court found that Martinez’s
proposed particular social group, “former MS-13 members from El
Salvador,” was immutable, because “the only way that Martinez could
change his membership in the group would be to rejoin MS-13.”109
The court remanded the case back down to the BIA for further
proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion.110
Contrary to these decisions, the First Circuit, in 2013, created the
now-existing circuit split in deciding Cantarero v. Holder.111 In
Cantarero, the court rejected the argument that petitioner was part of a
particular social group, holding that being a former gang member is
not an immutable characteristic.112 The petitioner, Kevin Fabricio
Claros Cantarero, was born and raised in El Salvador and at the age of
twelve left El Salvador for the United States to join his parents.113
Upon arriving in the United States, he became the beneficiary of the
Temporary Protected Status Program (TPS) and has remained in the
United States ever since.114 When Cantarero was sixteen years old he
joined the 18th Street gang.115 Petitioner testified that “he joined the
East Boston arm of the 18th Street gang,” and tattooed himself with
various tattoos that identified him as a member, some of which were
difficult to hide.116 A couple of years after joining the gang, petitioner

107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

115
116

8009-71de85b9c527_story.html?utm_term=.63cc1807d3f8
[https://perma.cc/J3YH-93G3].
Gold, supra note 103, at 1.
Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 913 (4th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 906.
Id. at 913.
Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 86-87 (1st Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 83.
Id. The text of the Temporary Protected Status (8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a) (1952))
reads, “Temporary Protected Status (TPS): (a) Granting of Status (1) In general.
- In the case of an alien who is a national of a foreign state (c), the Attorney
General, in accordance with this section - (A) may grant the alien temporary
protected status in the United States and shall not remove the alien from the
United States during the period in which such status is in effect[].”
Cantarero, 734 F.3d at 83.
Id.
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became afraid of the violent nature of the gang after a gang-related
shooting occurred when he was out partying one night.117 Shortly
afterwards, petitioner experienced a religious conversion and left the
gang, resulting in him being beaten by active members.118 Leaders of
the gang threatened petitioner, stating that being a gang member was a
“lifelong commitment and that if he tried to leave, the gang would kill
him or members of his family.”119 Petitioner argued that, if deported to
El Salvador, he feared persecution from the Salvadoran branch of the
18th Street gang because of his decision to leave the gang.120 He felt
he would be an easy target to rival gangs and police authorities in El
Salvador because of his gang tattoos.121
The court in Cantarero recognized that the INA does not define
particular social group nor does it provide “guidance in the legislative
history as to its meaning,” but refused to go further than acknowledge
the lack of legislative guidance.122 The First Circuit notes that its “role
in the process of interpreting th[e] phrase is quite limited,” reasoning
that they “must uphold the BIA’s interpretation.”123 Despite
recognition by the First Circuit that “‘both courts and commentators
have struggled to define it . . . and read in its broadest literal sense, the
phrase is almost completely open ended.’”124 Furthermore, the First
Circuit held that: (1) in offering refugee protections for individuals
facing persecution, Congress did not intend for asylum protections to
include violent street gangs;125 and (2) the arguments posed by the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits are not strong enough to overcome
Chevron deference.126 The First Circuit disagrees that former gang
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id. at 84.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id. (quoting Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir.1993)).
Id.
Id. at 87; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984). The notion of Chevron deference refers to the deference the
judiciary grants an administrative agency in their statutory interpretation, or in
other words, their interpretation of statutes and words within the statutes that
have delegated regulatory authority. See also Valerie C. Brannon & Jared P.
Cole, Chevron Deference: A Primer, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 1
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members are a particular social group, asserting that the Seventh
Circuit’s finding is “largely superfluous . . . since, by its reasoning,
anyone persecuted for any reason (other than perhaps a personal
grudge) might be said to be in such a [social] group.”127
In 2016, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Garay Reyes v.
Lynch and became the latest case to join the circuit split.128 In Garay
Reyes the court upheld the BIA’s decision that petitioner was not a
member of a particular social group.129 Petitioner joined the Mara 18
gang in El Salvador at seventeen years old.130 During his tenure with
the gang, Garay served as a driver for a few robberies, but soon
became disenchanted with the violence and lifestyle of the gang and
decided to leave.131 Fearing for his life, and retribution from the gang
leader, who had previously announced that anyone trying to leave the
gang could be punished by beatings or death, Garay went into
hiding.132 Garay moved to another town, but was eventually found by
the gang’s leader and shot in the leg.133 A few months later, he was
attacked a second time by machete wielding assailants.134 At the age of
eighteen, Garay had his gang tattoo removed and subsequently left for

127
128
129
130
132
132
133
134

(Sept.
19,
2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44954.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TB8Y-4XLC]. “Congress has created numerous administrative
agencies to implement and enforce delegated regulatory authority. Federal
statutes define the scope and reach of agencies’ power, granting them discretion
to, for example, promulgate regulations, conduct adjudications, issue licenses,
and impose sanctions for violations of the law. The Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) confers upon the judiciary an important role in policing these
statutory boundaries, directing federal courts to ‘set aside agency action’ that is
‘not in accordance with law’ or ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations.’ Courts will thus invalidate an action that exceeds an agency’s
statutory authorization or otherwise violates the law. Of course, in exercising its
statutory authorities, an agency necessarily must determine what the various
statutes that govern its actions mean. This includes statutes the agency
specifically is charged with administering as well as laws that apply broadly to
all or most agencies.” Id.
Cantarero, 734 F.3d at 87.
See generally Garay Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1129.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1130.
Id.
Id.
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the United States.135 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that substantial
evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that Garay’s proposed group
lacked social distinction and as such was not a cognizable particular
social group.136
V. PROCEDURAL: CHEVRON DEFERENCE
The Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council recognized the importance of deferring to an
administrative agency in determining certain issues of law.137 To
decide whether an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute
ought to be granted Chevron deference, courts must determine whether
Congress has spoken on the issue in question.138 If Congress has
spoken on the issue, and its intent is clear, the administrative agency
must give effect to Congress’ expressed intent.139 If Congress has not
spoken on the issue, and a statute is found to be “silent or ambiguous
. . . a court may grant deference to an agency’s interpretation where it
is a permissible construction of the statute.”140 The Supreme Court has
long “recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to
administrative interpretations.”141 As one New York Time’s article
reported:
In today’s regulatory world, agencies often step in to
fill the gap, putting forth their own interpretation of a
statute. The principle of the Chevron case says that a
federal court will defer to a federal agency’s views.
One rationale for this doctrine is that an agency, with

135
136
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138
139
140
141

Id.
Id.at 1138.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
See Kersh, supra note 7, at 166.
Id.
Id.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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its expertise, is better positioned than a judge to know a
statute’s meaning.142
Thus, Chevron deference is an important doctrinal element to consider
when analyzing legal issues regarding administrative agencies,
specifically in regard to quasi-judicial entities like the BIA.143 It is not
disputed that Chevron deference applies to the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ decisions, or interpretations of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act.144 In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the “principles of Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory
scheme.”145 The Court noted that the Attorney General has “delegated
to the BIA the ‘discretion and authority conferred upon by the
Attorney General by law’ in the course of ‘considering and
determining cases before it.’”146 Therefore, the BIA “should be
accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms
‘concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.’”147
Thus, the refusal of circuit courts to give deference to the BIA in the
aforementioned cases is significant because when a circuit court
reverses an administrative agency it has good reason.148 The fact that
three circuit courts have held contrary to the BIA on the issue of
whether former gang members constitute a particular social group
should be a compelling basis for both the First and Ninth Circuits to
reverse the BIA.149
In holding contrary to the BIA on whether former gang members
constitute a particular social group, the circuit courts took into
consideration the Chevron deference doctrine.150 In Martinez the court
142

143
144
145
146
147
148
149

150

Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Agencies Decide Law? Doctrine May Be
Tested at Gorsuch Hearing, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/business/dealbook/neil-gorsuch-chevrondeference.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/SD54-5U4G].
See id.
See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 517 (citation omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
See generally Brannon & Cole, supra note 126, at 1.
Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 906 & 909 (4th Cir. 2014); Urbina-Mejia v.
Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 365-66 (6th Cir. 2010); Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426,
429 & 431 (7th Cir. 2009). But see Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 86-87 (1st
Cir. 2013); Garay Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2016).
See Martinez, 740 F.3d at 909.
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stated, “in conducting our review, we generally give Chevron
deference to the BIA’s statutory interpretations, recognizing that
Congress conferred on the BIA decision-making power to decide such
questions of law.”151 However, procedurally, the court found that:
[b]ecause the decision . . . was issued by a single BIA
member, it does not constitute a precedential opinion,
as a precedential opinion may only be issued by a
three-member panel . . . . When issuing a singlemember, nonprecedential opinion, the BIA is not
exercising its authority to make a rule carrying the
force of law, and thus the opinion is not entitled to
Chevron deference.152
Thus, in Martinez, the court did not grant the BIA Chevron deference,
though the court did give the BIA’s opinion some weight.153 In
Urbina-Mejia, the court, stated that “substantial deference is given to
the Board’s interpretation of the INA . . . unless the interpretation is
‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”154 The
Sixth Circuit held that as a matter of law, the Board erred in finding
that petitioner was not part of a particular social group.155 Although the
Sixth Circuit denied petitioner’s request, it held contrary to the BIA
that former gang members do constitute a particular social group, but
could not reverse the BIA’s decision because petitioner failed to
provide corroborating evidence to support his asylum claim.156 In
Ramos, the court did not discuss Chevron deference in its opinion;
however, the court did note that the opinion was “characteristically
terse, [and delivered by] one-member” of the panel.157 Similar to
Martinez, the court did not give deference to the BIA decision because
it was written by one-member.158
Much deference, however, was given to the BIA in Cantarero, the
court stating, “[b]ecause we are confronted with a question implicating
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id.
Id. at 909-10.
Id. at 910.
Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 364.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 367-68.
See generally Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 429 (7th Cir. 2009).
See generally id.; see also Martinez, 740 F.3d at 909-10.
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‘an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers,’ we
follow Chevron principles in our review of the BIA’s decision.”159 In
Garay Reyes the Ninth Circuit also afforded the BIA Chevron
deference, stating that “[c]onsistency with the agency’s past practice or
precedent is not required for an agency interpretation to be due
Chevron deference; a new or varying agency interpretation is
permitted, if it is adequately explained.”160 However, the BIA rarely
adequately explains its variance in decision making, yet it is often
afforded Chevron deference.161 In this instance, the BIA is not
providing a reasoned explanation, nor is it adequately explaining its
decision, rather it is “rewriting prior decisions so they appear to
conform to the new requirements.”162 The court held that the BIA’s
articulation of the particular social group requirements are consistent
with the statute, and reflects the agency’s ongoing efforts to construe
the ambiguous statutory phrase particular social group is reasonable
and “is entitled to Chevron deference.”163 However, such deference to
the BIA by the Ninth Circuit is erroneous, as the “social distinction”
and “particularity” requirements the BIA refers to are “plainly
arbitrary, incoherent, and internally contradictory.”164
Chevron deference is important to consider when arguing that the
First and Ninth Circuits should have reversed the BIA’s decision in
deciding whether former gang members constituted a particular social
group. The First Circuit recognized that “both courts and
commentators have struggled to define [the particular social group
standard] and read in its broadest literal sense, the phrase is almost
completely open-ended.”165 The BIA could interpret and apply such a
broad and open-ended phrase in an arbitrary or capricious way, such
159

160
161

162
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164
165

Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
Garay Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2016).
See generally Kersh, supra note 7; see also Kristin A. Bresnahan, The Board of
Immigration Appeals’s New Social Visibility Test for Determining Membership
of a Particular Social Group in Asylum Claims and Its Legal Policy
Implications, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 649, 669 (2011).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Garay Reyes v. Sessions 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.
2016), petition for cert filed, (U.S. Aug. 11, 2017) (No. 17-241) at 28.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 20.
Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 85 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Fatin v. I.N.S., 12
F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993).
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that the First Circuit should not have given the BIA deference.166
Finally, Chevron deference was at issue in National Cable and
Telecommunications v. Brand X, where the Supreme Court held that
“Chevron deference is not owed to agency interpretations that are
inconsistent with past interpretations and that are not adequately
explained by the agency.”167
A. Arbitrary and Capricious
Additionally, another reason why the First and Ninth Circuits
should not have given the BIA deference is that the BIA has defined
particular social group in an arbitrary or capricious manner.168 It is no
secret that immigration laws are complex to decipher; application
should be consistent to assist with the complexities that are
immigration laws and statutes.169 Scholars have recognized that
“immigration statutes of the United States are among the worst,
longest, most ambiguous, complicated, illogical, undemocratic and
arbitrary laws in the world.”170 This characterization is further
complicated by the BIA’s arbitrary application and interpretation.
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) authorizes courts to set
aside agency interpretations of statutes if the interpretations are
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”171 As such, an argument can be made that the
BIA’s interpretation of particular social group has been “arbitrary or
capricious.”172 This would not be the first time courts have found
BIA’s interpretation of immigration statutes arbitrary or capricious.173
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See id.
See generally Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 969-72 (2005); Preston, supra note 8, at 443.
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 43 (2011); Jack Wasserman, The
Undemocratic, Illogical and Arbitrary Immigration Laws of the United States, 3
INT’L LAW. 254, 254 (1969).
See generally Cristina M. Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration
Law: Lessons from the Decisions of Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor, YALE L.J.
F. (Mar. 2014).
Wasserman, supra note 168, at 254.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966).
See generally id.
See generally Judulang, 565 U.S. at 43 (holding that the BIA’s policy was
arbitrary and capricious).
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In 2011, the Supreme Court, in Judulang v. Holder, held that the
BIA’s “policy for deciding when resident aliens may apply to the
Attorney General for relief from deportation under a now-repealed
provision of immigration law[]” was arbitrary and capricious.174 In a
succinct opinion, the Court held that “when an administrative agency
sets policy, it must provide a reasonable explanation for its action.
That is not a high bar, but is an unwavering one. Here, the BIA has
failed to meet it.”175 By striking down the BIA’s policy regarding
relief from deportation, the Supreme Court did two things: 1) created
the most rigorous review of an immigration agency’s action under the
APA to date; and 2) affirmed the viability of the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard as a meaningful avenue of challenging the merits
of an immigration agency action under either the APA or Chevron.176
Legal scholars have also recognized that the BIA fails to meet or
provide reasonable explanation for why it makes the decisions it does,
and that it often crosses into making decisions that are arbitrary and/or
capricious.177 Additionally, the BIA has made interpretations of the
particular social group standard that are inconsistent.178 The BIA’s
interpretations cannot be relied upon to deliver consistent results to
assist in future decisions because there is no consensus regarding the
exact meaning of particular social group.179
The First Circuit in Cantarero accepted the BIA’s reasoning by
rejecting the petitioner’s argument that he was a member of a
particular social group.180 The First Circuit acknowledged that the BIA
first interpreted the phrase particular social group in Matter of Acosta
as referring to “a group of persons all of whom share a common,
immutable characteristic.”181 The court then noted that “in subsequent
174
175
176

177
178
179

180
181

Id. at 45.
Id.
Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion: How Judulang Limits Executive
Immigration Policy-Making Authority and Opens Channels for Future
Challenges, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 48 (2012).
Preston, supra note 8, at 443.
Id.
Id.; see also Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 85 (1st Cir. 2013) (explaining
that the INA does not define particular social group and that there is “no
guidance in the legislative history as to its meaning,” but refused to go further
than acknowledge the lack of legislative guidance).
Cantarero, 734 F.3d at 87.
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (BIA 1985).
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decisions, the BIA elaborated that the proffered characteristic must
make the group socially visible and sufficiently particular.”182 Finally,
the court highlighted that the BIA denied petitioner’s claim of a
“proposed group on the grounds that recognizing former members of
violent criminal gangs as a particular social group would undermine
the legislative purpose of the INA.”183 The court noted that they did
not find this interpretation unreasonable or impermissible; even though
it could be argued to be arbitrary and capricious for failing to
acknowledge that petitioner met the particular social group standard,
and at a minimum ought to be afforded the opportunity to submit an
asylum claim.184
VI. CIRCUIT COURT CASES AND THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
STANDARD
Of the five grounds for asylum delineated in the Refugee Act,185
the particular social group is the one that is most heavily scrutinized
because its boundaries are ambiguous.186 This ambiguity allows
individuals who fear returning to their country of origin, but do not fit
the other four categories, to seek asylum.187 On the other hand, the
ambiguity of the particular social group standard makes it so that
deserving groups are arbitrarily denied protections under asylum
law.188
How, then, do courts determine which groups are deserving of a
particular social group distinction and which are not? Because the
particular social group category does not have a statutory definition,
the BIA and appellate courts are free to interpret the statute as they see
fit.189 This Article argues that the First Circuit erred in its decision that
182
183
184
185
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187

188
189

Cantarero, 734 F.3d at 85.
Id.
See id.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-212, § 201(a)(42)(A), 94 Stat. 102 (1980)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. § 1521 et seq. (1952)).
Benjamin Casper et al., Matter of M-E-V-G- and the BIA’s Confounding Legal
Standard for “Membership in a Particular Social Group,” 14-06 IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS 1, 3 (2014).
Blake, Getting to Group, supra note 53, at 167; see also Casper, supra note 186,
at 3.
Blake, Getting to Group, supra note 53, at 168.
Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546 (6th Cir. 2003).
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former gang members are not a particular social group.190 The
argument that Congress did not intend “to include violent street gangs”
in its offering of refugee protections does not stand because there have
been other groups, of similar characteristics, that have been granted
asylum under the particular social group category.191
A. Former Gang Members are a Particular Social Group
The First Circuit held that “a former gang member was still a gang
member.”192 Rejecting the argument that former gang members are a
particular social group, the First Circuit discredits the arguments made
by the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.193 However, the First
Circuit is wrong; former gang members are a particular social group,
as they meet the test set forth in Matter of Acosta.194
1. Former Gang Members: Immutable Characteristic
The court in Martinez asserted that “[a]t the outset . . . Martinez’s
membership in a group that constitutes former MS-13 members is
immutable,” because the only way to change this immutable
characteristic is to rejoin the MS-13, which violates a fundamental part
of petitioner’s conscience.195 MS-13 members share common,
immutable characteristics; namely, “their past experiences together,
their initiation rites, and their status as Spanish-speaking immigrants in
the United States.”196 Past experiences, by their very nature are
immutable, because they have already occurred and cannot be
undone.197 This finding could also be applied to a particular social
group of former members of the 18th Street gang, as all former gang
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Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 86-87 (1st Cir. 2013).
See Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 905-06 (4th Cir. 2014); Urbina-Mejia v.
Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 2010); Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 431
(7th Cir. 2009). But see Garay Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir.
2016); Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2013).
Cantarero, 734 F.3d at 86.
Martinez, 740 F.3d at 905-06; Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 362; Ramos, 589 F.3d
at 431.
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).
Martinez, 740 F.3d at 911.
Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir. 2003).
In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 958 (BIA 2006).
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members, regardless of specific gang affiliation, share common
immutable characteristics.198
The petitioner in Urbina-Mejia argued that changing such an
immutable part of an individual “would be [an] unconscionable [thing]
for [asylum seekers] to change” because it is “a characteristic that
either is beyond the power of an individual to change or is so
fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be
required to be changed.”199 The BIA held that petitioner had failed to
“show that the characteristic which he possesses is so fundamental to
his identity that it would be unconscionable for him to change it.”200
However, the BIA was incorrect in its holding, because it is beyond
the power of a former gang member to change the status of a “former
gang member,” unless they rejoin the gang and become an active gang
member.201 Martinez reasoned that “[Martinez’s] repudiation of gang
membership, along with its violence and criminality, is a critical aspect
of his conscience that he should not be forced to change.”202
2. Former Gang Members: Particularity
The criterion of “particularity” within the particular social group
standard refers to “whether the group is ‘sufficiently distinct’ that it
would constitute a ‘discrete class of persons.’”203 This term,
“particularity,” establishes that it is critical to consider how a group is
described, and that it be described in a way that is commonly accepted
within the society in which the group is a part.204 The group must be
“discrete and have definable boundaries–it must not be amorphous,
overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”205
Former gang members meet the particularity requirement. Within
their society, former gang members are a “discrete class of persons,”
specifically, former gang members, not active or inactive gang
198
199

200

201
202
203
204
205

See Martinez, 740 F.3d at 912; see also Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 366.
Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 365; Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. at 233 (explaining
the background reasoning that the petitioner used).
Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 365 (explaining that the Board was reaffirming the
immigrations judge’s finding).
Martinez, 740 F.3d at 911.
Id. at 912.
See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 210 (BIA 2014) (citation omitted).
Id. at 213-14.
Id. at 214.
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members.206 This “definable boundary” and discrete distinction
immediately separates these former gang members from any other
types of gang members.207 Thus, the argument that the MS-13 and
18th Street gangs constitute a particular social group is plausible.208
Determining whether an individual is a former gang member is
straightforward; they either are or are not; however, there is ambiguity
as to whether the MS-13 or 18th Street gang are merely gangs because
they are known for their notoriously violent ways, whose influence
and reach is transcontinental, leading some sociologists to consider
them powerful criminal syndicates.209
3. Former Gang Members: Socially Distinct
In Matter of M-E-V-G-, the courts renamed the social visibility
criterion of the particular social group test as “social distinction.”210
The courts never imposed ocular visibility as a prerequisite for a viable
particular social group, as not all groups will encompass visible
characteristics.211 Courts recognized that some particular social
groups, with social distinction, “involved characteristics that were
highly visible,”212 and other particular social groups that were not
visible.213 The social distinction terminology refers to a particular
social group that has recognition within the society of which they are a
part.214
Most individuals living in Central America, where gangs are
prevalent, can easily recognize and identify members of the MS-13
and 18th Street gangs.215 The argument remains that they might not be
206
207
208

209
210
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212
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214
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See id. at 210, 221-22.
Id. at 214, 221-22.
See Lorena S. Rivas-Tiemann, Asylum to a Particular Social Group: New
Developments and Its Future for Gang-Violence, 47 TULSA L. REV. 477, 498
(2013).
Id. at 442; see generally Arnson & Olson, supra note 10, at 1.
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 236 (BIA 2014).
Id. at 238.
In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (BIA 2006).
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. at 238.
Id. at 240.
See generally Maras: Las Pandillas Que Aterrorizan Centroamérica, SPUTNIK
MUNDO
(Oct.
08,
2016,
9:38
PM),
https://mundo.sputniknews.com/americalatina/201608101062742221-maraspandilla/ [https://perma.cc/PK2D-MXJH]; see also VICTOR M. RODRÍGUEZ &
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able to identify former gang members as easily.216 The Ninth Circuit
argued that former gang members should not be considered a
particular social group because “the category of non-associated or
disaffiliated persons . . . is far too unspecific and amorphous.”217
However, the Sixth Circuit in Ramos held that petitioner was a
member of a “specific, well-recognized, indeed notorious gang, the
former members of which do not constitute a ‘category . . . far too
unspecific and amorphous to be called a social group.’”218
In Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA found that former Mara 18 gang
members do not meet the “social distinction” requirement for a
particular social group.219 The BIA held that, although there is some
evidence of societal views towards former gang members, it is difficult
to discern whether “discrimination occurs because of their status as
known former gang members or because their tattoos create doubts or
confusion about whether they are, in fact, former, rather than active,
gang members.”220 That logic, however, is faulty as it does not
consider how the persecutors of former gang members view this group
as socially distinct.221 The BIA further stated that the social distinction
ought to be based on the perception of society in general rather than
the persecutor because basing social distinction on the perception of
the persecutor could lead to groups being defined solely by the

ROBERTO CUELLAR, INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES JURÍDICAS, EL FENÓMENO
DE LAS MARAS EN CENTROAMÉRICA: UN ESTUDIO PENAL CON UN ENFOQUE DE
DERECHOS
HUMANOS
187,
190,

216
217
218
219
220
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https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/6/2506/11.pdf (last visited
May 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/NH2H-B5QV]; see generally Rebeca García
Bravo, Maras en Centroamérica y México, COMISIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE AYUDA AL
REFUGIADO,
13
(2013),
https://cear.es/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/CENTROAMERICA.-2013.-Maras.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D4LM-R3QH] (explaining that what make these gangs easily
identifiable are the markings they put upon their bodies, such as tattoos on their
faces, and the distinctive hand signals they use to communicate and mark their
territory). Id.
See Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id.
Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 222 (BIA 2014).
Id.
See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 236 (BIA 2014); see also Matter
of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. at 222.
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persecution they face.222 However, the BIA fails to consider that
asylum seekers are seldom perceived by society in general, but rather
are perceived by the perpetrators as socially distinct when the
perpetrator decides to persecute an individual.223
B. Former Gang Members Are a Particular Social Group
1. Arbitrary and Capricious: BIA’s Application of the
Particular Social Group Standard
The BIA’s application of the particular social group is arbitrary
and capricious because it considers separate aspects of the particular
social group test when it makes its decisions. The court in Lukwago v.
Ashcroft reasoned that “what constitutes a ‘particular social group’ [is]
difficult to discern.”224 The BIA’s application of such a phrase differs
by circuit.225 The First, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have all
adopted the BIA’s approach, which defined the term particular social
group as a group composed of individuals who share a “common,
immutable characteristic.”226 The Second Circuit has defined
“particular social group” as “individuals who possess some
fundamental characteristic in common which serves to distinguish
them in the eyes of a persecutor.”227 The Ninth Circuit recently
changed its definition to harmonize with the BIA’s definition, and now
recognizes that a “‘particular social group’ is one united by a voluntary
association, including a former association, or by an innate
characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of
its members that members either cannot or should not be required to
change it.”228
The Sixth Circuit in Castellano-Chacon recognized that the
definition of particular social group is a “flexible one, which
encompasses a wide variety of groups who do not otherwise fall within
the other categories.”229 The BIA’s application of the particular social
222
223
224
225
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Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. at 217-18.
Blake, Getting to Group, supra note 53, at 175.
Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2003).
See Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted).
Id.
Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 546 (citation omitted).
Id. at 549.
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group standard is quite arbitrary.230 The same circuit issued two
different rulings on cases based on similar facts.231 The Sixth Circuit,
in Urbina-Mejia, held that the BIA was wrong in finding that
petitioner was not part of a particular social group,232 while in a
factually similar case, Castellano-Chacon, the Sixth Circuit upheld the
BIA’s decision that a former gang member was not a particular social
group.233
In Castellano-Chacon, the petitioner was a native of Honduras,
who at eighteen joined a New York branch of MS-13, just two years
after illegally entering the country.234 A few years later, petitioner
decided to leave the MS-13 gang because of the perpetual violence
within the gang, and because so many members were being jailed.235
Castellano-Chacon applied for asylum, but was time-barred from
applying because he had missed the one-year statute of limitations.236
He then applied for withholding of removal, which does not maintain a
one-year deadline, and wherein “the courts consider the same factors
to determine eligibility for both asylum and withholding.”237
Castellano-Chacon alleged he had a fear of persecution based on his
membership in a particular social group.238 The court held that he did
not maintain such a membership.239 The court further held that
“external perception of a group is a relevant factor to consider in
making a determination as to whether a group” is a particular social
group.240 Admittedly, the court did state that “it is possible to conceive
of the [former or present] members of MS-13 as a particular social
group,” but petitioner here does not argue that as the basis of his
membership.241
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Bresnahan, supra note 161, at 669.
See Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 2010).
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Id. at 538.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 541-42 (explaining that in order for petitioners to be eligible for asylum
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Petitioner in Castellano-Chacon was time-barred from requesting
asylum, and instead opted to request for a withholding of removal.242
Procedurally, withholding of removal and asylum are different, such
that there is no time bar for a petitioner to request withholding of
removal as there is in asylum, but the factors for determination remain
the same.243 In a withholding of removal, just as in asylum, the
petitioner must show their “life or freedom would be threatened in his
or her home country on account of one of the same five grounds
necessary for asylum (race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion).”244 Because the
substantive legal factors remain the same for withholding of removal
and asylum, the particular social group discussion in CastellanoChacon is relevant and applicable to the argument of this Article.
The differences between the groups asserted in Ramos, where
petitioner argued that they were part of a group of former gang
members,245 and Castellano-Chacon, where petitioner argued they
were part of a group of “tattooed youth” who also happen to be former
gang members, are nuanced.246 Despite the distinction, the BIA
applied the particular social group test arbitrarily and inconsistently
because it considered separate aspects of the particular social group
test in making its determination.247 It is incomprehensible that a circuit
court granted Chevron deference to the BIA, when its varied
interpretation of the particular social group standard seems quite
“arbitrary and capricious.” 248 The courts have found that:
[T]he legislative history of the INA fails to “shed much
light on the meaning of the phrase ‘particular social
group’” [and] given the ambiguity of the language,
[the role of the court] is limited to reviewing the BIA’s
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Id. at 541.
Id. at 544-45.
Id. at 545.
Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 428 (7th Cir. 2009).
Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 549.
See generally Ramos, 589 F.3d at 426; Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 545.
Wasserman, supra note 168, at 254 (explaining that immigration statutes in the
United States are arbitrary).
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interpretation, using Chevron deference to determine if
it is a “permissible construction of the statute.”249
This Article posits that the BIA should not be given deference when its
interpretation and application of a statute is arbitrary and capricious.
C. Bad Actors as Protected Particular Social Groups
The First Circuit held, and supported the BIA’s reasoning, that
“recognizing former members of violent criminal gangs as a particular
social group would undermine the legislative purpose of the INA.”250
It is worthwhile to note that the INA bans certain individuals from
obtaining immigration relief.251 Merely establishing a characteristic,
such as membership in a particular social group, is one of the many
requirements for asylum, and proving one’s membership in a
cognizable group does not entitle an applicant any form of relief.252
Under the INA, bans from gaining asylum relief would include
“persecutors and those who have committed a ‘serious nonpolitical
crime.’”253 However, these bans should not have any bearing on
whether the applicant is an actual member of the claimed particular
social group.254 These bans should only come into effect after the
applicant is deemed to fall within one of the five protected
categories.255 The argument that Congress “did not mean to grant
asylum to those whose association with a criminal syndicate has
caused them to run into danger”256 is unpersuasive. Former gang
members should be recognized as a particular social group, just as
former members of brutal criminal gangs are.257 At the very least,
courts should entertain the argument that former gang members
constitute a particular social group, and remand back to the BIA to
249
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Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 171 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Fatin v. INS,
12 F.3d 1233, 1239 (3d Cir. 1993).
Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 85 (1st Cir. 2013).
Id. at 87 (citation omitted).
Id. at 85.
Id. at 87 (citation omitted).
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Id. at 86.
See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 614-16 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining the
court’s rationale for overturning the BIA’s decision that defectors from a brutal
criminal gang, Mungiki, in Kenya would not receive asylum).
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make such a finding or require the BIA to explain its reasoning when it
fails to make the finding. This was the case in Koudriachova v.
Gonzales, when the court found the argument that former KGB agents
could be a particular social group persuasive, stating that “it appears
that the BIA may have misapplied its own Acosta test in reaching this
determination.”258 In other words, the court held that former KGB
agents were not a particular social group, and remanded the case back
to the BIA to either classify the petitioner as a member of the
particular social group or explain why it could not.259 These groups, all
similar in nature, are groups that are perceived as “groups whose
members had formerly participated in antisocial or criminal
conduct.”260 These groups have been afforded asylum protections,
despite their violent pasts, and their arguments that they are a
particular social group have been heard and strongly considered in
their favor.261
In Gatimi v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit held that a former
member of a violent Kenyan tribal group, the Mungiki, was a member
of a particular social group.262 Francis Gatimi joined the Kikuyo group
called the Mungiki in 1995.263 The group is known as “a thuggish
army terrorizing Kenya with extortion rackets and gruesome
punishments.”264 The group also requires women, including wives of
members and of defectors, “to undergo clitoridectomy and
258
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260
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See Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 2007). The Circuit
court reasoned that the BIA had misapplied the Acosta test in their finding that
former KGB agents who defected were not a particular social group. Id. at 262.
The court refused to make the ruling, noting that “[i]t is not our task to
determine, in the first instance, whether the group of defected KGB agents
constitute a particular social group. Rather, in accordance with the Supreme
Court’s mandate . . . we remand to the BIA for additional investigation or
explanation with respect to the question of whether defected KGB agents form a
particular social group under the INA.” Id. at 263.
Id. at 262. (The subsequent BIA case was unpublished and it could not be
determined what the final disposition of the case on remand turned out to be).
See Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 911 (4th Cir. 2014).
See Koudriachova, 490 F.3d at 264; Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 614-16; Martinez, 740
F.3d at 911.
See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616.
Id. at 613.
Christopher Goffard, Court Sheds Light on Scary Kenya Gang, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 27, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/27/world/la-fg-kenyamungiki-20111127 [https://perma.cc/3KD4-FKFS].
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excision.”265 Gatimi defected from the group in 1999 and not long
after the group broke into his home looking for him.266 Unable to find
him, they killed his servant instead.267 In one instance, the group
kidnapped and tortured petitioner and released him only after he
promised to produce his wife for circumcision.268 Petitioner left Kenya
and applied for asylum in the United States.269
The Seventh Circuit reversed the BIA’s decision that the petitioner
was not a member of a particular social group, refuting the BIA’s
argument that petitioner did not meet the “social visibility” criterion
for determining a particular social group.270 The court criticized the
BIA for its inconsistent application of the “social visibility” element
stating that “when an administrative agency’s decisions are
inconsistent, a court cannot pick one of the inconsistent lines and defer
to that one.”271 Further, “such picking and choosing would condone
arbitrariness and usurp the agency’s responsibilities.”272 The court
found that the Mungiki constituted a particular social group because
Gatimi met the prongs of the particular social group standard.273 The
BIA had refused to recognize Gatimi as a member of a particular
social group because he had not met the “socially visible” prong of the
standard.274 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, claiming it
“makes no sense” because the Board has not attempted “in this or [in]
any other case, to explain the reasoning behind the criterion of social
visibility.”275 The Board has been “inconsistent rather than silent. It
has found groups to be ‘particular social groups’ without reference to
social visibility.”276
In a similar case, Koudriachova v. Gonzales, the Second Circuit
held that the BIA misapplied its own test when it held that KGB
265
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intelligence agents that defected to the United States were not
members of a particular social group.277 The petitioner in
Koudriachova was a native of the former United Soviet Socialist
Republic (USSR), who was drafted into mandatory service by the
Soviet military when he was eighteen years old.278 Not long after
joining the military, petitioner was drafted into the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (“MVD”), which was comprised of “a special group of troops
responsible for guarding secret military objects and locations,
controlling riots in prisons and student towns, and fulfilling special
assignments relating to terrorism and saboteur groups.”279
After completing his term of military service in 1983, and during
his third year at the Institute of Meteorology, petitioner was
summoned to report to the KGB Intelligence Service headquarters.280
Petitioner was chosen by the soviet government to work with the
Intelligence Service agency as a spy.281 He did not wish to be a KGB
agent, but felt he had no other choice.282 During his tenure as a KGB
agent, and before he attended spy school, petitioner worked
undercover as a spy at a factory that employed many foreign
specialists.283 Petitioner would often report to a supervisor within the
KGB on information he had obtained from his co-workers.284 As the
date neared for petitioner to attend spy school, he decided that he was
going to defect to the United States.285 Petitioner distanced himself
from his KGB supervisor by relocating homes.286 Not long after
moving, two men attacked him on the street; petitioner believed the
two men were sent by the KGB.287 Petitioner and his family eventually
left the USSR and entered the United States with visitor visas on
September 20, 1992.288
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288

See Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2007).
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The court in Koudriachova held that the BIA misapplied its test to
determine whether a group constitutes a particular social group.289 In
the initial underlying BIA case, the BIA concluded that petitioner was
not a member of a particular social group.290 The BIA reasoned that
“because the evidence did not establish that defected KGB agents
maintain ‘any associational relationship’ or share ‘any recognizable
and discrete characteristics,’” they were not a particular social group –
this is incorrect.291 The Second Circuit noted that “[n]o such
associational relationship is required” to make a particular social group
determination.292 While the court did not explicitly state that KGB
agents are not a particular social group, it did not uphold the BIA’s
decision and instead remanded the case back down to the BIA.293
The court did not make issue of the fact that Koudriachova had
been a part of a criminal syndicate, nor did the court in Gatimi.294
Petitioners were involved in organizations that are notorious for
perpetuating criminal acts against other individuals.295 Both the
Seventh and Second Circuits failed to raise those issues against
petitioners when determining whether these asylum seekers might be
eligible for asylum as members of a particular social group.296 The
INA offers other bars to keep dangerous individuals from receiving
asylum protections, after the issue of whether they are members of a
particular social group has been resolved.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Five circuits have addressed whether former gang members
constitute a particular social group under asylum law.297 Three circuits
have accepted the argument that former gang members were a
289
290
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293
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See id.
Id. at 263.
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See generally id.; see also Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009).
Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 613; Koudriachova, 490 F.3d at 259.
See generally Gatimi, 578 F.3d 611; see also Koudriachova, 490 F.3d 255.
See Garay Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016); Martinez v. Holder,
740 F.3d 902 (4th Cir. 2014); Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2013);
Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2010); Ramos v. Holder, 589
F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009).
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particular social group298 and two others have rejected it.299 The two
circuits rejecting this position erred in their decisions because former
gang members constitute a particular social group, for being a former
gang member is an immutable quality that cannot or should not be
required to change.300 Additionally, former gang members are a
socially distinct group, especially when considering how they are
viewed by their persecutors.301 Lastly, other groups, similar in nature
to former gang members, have been given the particular social group
distinction and have been afforded asylum protections.302 Because
persuasive case precedent exists, former gang members should,
undoubtedly, be deemed, and considered, a particular social group;
298

299

300

301

302

See Martinez, 740 F.3d at 906 (accepting the argument that former gang
members are a particular social group, because being a former gang member is
an immutable characteristic); see also Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 365-67
(accepting the argument that former gang members are a particular social group
because it is a part of their conscience they cannot change); see also Ramos, 589
F.3d at 430-31 (accepting the argument that former gang members are a
particular social group because they are socially visible).
See Garay Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1138 (upholding the BIA’s decision that former
gang members are not a particular social group); see also Cantarero, 734 F.3d at
87 (rejecting the argument that former gang members are a particular social
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the BIA interpreted “the phrase ‘persecution on account of membership in a
particular social group’ to mean persecution that is directed toward an individual
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characteristic . . . [and that] whatever the common characteristic that defines the
group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual
identities or consciences.” Id.
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of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 211 (BIA 2014); see also Kelly, supra note 71,
at 226. The argument here is that the perception ought to be from the perspective
of the individual doing the persecuting and not just any random observer. See id.
at 230.
See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009) (affording asylum to
defectors from a brutal Kenyan criminal gang, Mungiki.); see also
Koudriachova, 490 F.3d 255 (recognizing that KGB agents who defect could be
recognized as a particular social group, the court remanded the case back to the
BIA to make a determination, strongly suggesting that they should be classified
as a particular social group); see also Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d
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similar to other groups that are unquestionably recognized as
particular.
In August 2017, a petition for writ of cert with the Supreme Court
was filed on behalf of Garay Reyes, petitioner of the Ninth Circuit
case Garay Reyes v. Holder.303 In January 2018, the petition was
denied by the Court.304 However, it is worth noting that petitioner, in
his petition, asserted the arguments delineated in this Article,
unequivocally stating that the BIA should not have been afforded
deference by the Ninth Circuit due to its arbitrary and capricious
application of the particular social group standard requirements.305
Counsel for petitioner argued that former gang members are a
cognizable particular social group and meet the requirements set forth
by the BIA through a number of precedent-setting decisions.306 It is
unfortunate that the Court denied the writ of cert, because the Court
missed an opportunity to articulate with specificity what a particular
social group is; or at the very least, provide guidance in the context of
former gang members.307 The Supreme Court has tradition of
chastising the BIA for being arbitrary or capricious, and this case
could have further admonished the BIA’s penchant for making
arbitrary decisions without providing adequate explanations for
them.308 While it was not the proper time for the Court to consider this
case, it is an issue that warrants attention sooner rather than later. In
this political climate, with the targeting of any and all undocumented
immigrants in the United States, it would be proper and timely for the
Supreme Court to consider granting a petition of this sort.309 There has
never been a better time for the judiciary to address the concerns of
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305
306
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immigrants, particularly those seeking asylum, than now.310 It is not
only former gang members who stand to be victims of violence
perpetrated by gangs in Central America, but also innocent people who
have no ties to gangs.311 If gangs in Central America are targeting
citizens who have no relationship with gangs, what can be said of what
will happen to former gang members who have turned their backs on
the gangs; such gangs function with impunity and have no problem
killing people to teach a lesson.312
Julio Martinez, petitioner in Martinez v. Holder, had his execution
ordered by the gang leader when he departed from the gang.313 He was
stabbed by a group of attackers and left for dead.314 He then tried to
flee to another village, but was tracked down and shot at,
demonstrating that for the gang, nothing but death will satisfy their
desire for retribution.315
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